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PREFACE 
This sub-thesis is an account of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(ABRI) in Irian Jaya. It examines the pursuit by the military of 
internal security and development objectives and the consequences 
for the population of Irian Jaya. 
Chapter 1 briefly looks at the broad roles of ABRI and their 
relevance to Irian Jaya. It provides an historical overview of 
the Indonesia-Dutch dispute over Irian Jaya and the arrival of 
ABRI in the province. 
My aim in chapter 2 is to detail the organisation and strength of 
military forces in Irian Jaya. This analysis leads to conclusions 
about the role of the military in the province and provides a 
framework from which to analyse Indonesian military activity in 
Irian Jaya. Chapter 2 also sets out to ascertain whether ABRI has 
the military capability in Irian Jaya to threaten Papua New 
Guinea. 
Chapter 3 examines the objectives of the military in Irian Jaya, 
how policies are implemented and the effect of policy 
implementation on the indigenous population. My aim is to find 
out how security is maintained in the province, the importance of 
development projects to military authorities and whether 
development projects take account of Irianese aspirations. 
The final chapter provides a brief summary of the discussion and 
the repercussions for Papua New Guinea and Australia of ABRI's 
internal security and development roles in Irian Jaya. 
I am grateful to Dr Leszek Buszynski for encouraging me to 
complete this work. His contribution to putting this sub-thesis 
together was essential. I am responsible for the translation of 
Indonesian texts and for any errors of fact or judgement. 
Finally, to the many people who assisted me along the way, I 
offer my sincere thanks. 
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1. IRIAN JAYA: AN INTRODUCTION 
THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES 
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) is both a 
military force and a social-political force in Indonesian 
society.l As a military force, ABRI is responsible for the 
defence of Indonesia from internal and external threats. In the 
context of defending against internal threats, ABRI sees itself 
as the guarantor of Indonesian unity and stability as well as the 
guardian of the constitution and national philosophy, Pancasila. 2 
In the social-political role, military appointees occupy 
positions in the public service and state-run institutions and 
enterprises, and fill one-fifth of the seats in the national and 
provincial parliaments. As a social-political force, ABRI assumes 
responsibility for motivating the population to achieve 
development goals as set out in the five-year development plans. 
The military refers to its dual function in terms of its roles as 
a 'stabiliser' and 'dynamiser,.3 As a stabiliser, the armed 
forces aims to provide a framework of unity and stability within 
which development can occur. As a dynamiser, the mil i tary 
endeavours to assist in the achievement of development goals. 4 
From the military's perspective, development (pembangunan) has 
both a physical and psychological dimension and thus encompasses 
2 
a range of factors including economic development, political 
development and development in the social and cuI tural fields. 5 
For the military, development depends largely on the maintenance 
of internal stability, and internal stability is in turn related 
to the prosperity and welfare of the people. The interdependence 
between welfare and securi ty means that development assumes a 
high degree of importance to mili tary authori ties. Any matter 
that hinders development is a threat to security.6 
There is a view wi thin the military that the Indonesian people 
are easily led, politically immature and require close 
supervision. 7 The close supervision of the population is 
manifested in, for example, the need to obtain approval for 
travel, meetings, sermons and publications. 8 As an example in the 
political sphere, all campaign speeches for the 1987 general 
election were scrutinised by a committee prior to public delivery 
to ensure consistency with Pancasila ethics. 9 
The security si tuation at any given time is described as aman 
(peaceful, secure), rawan (troubled, disturbed), gawat (serious) , 
kritis (critical) and bahaya (dangerous).10 Security is viewed as 
a spectrum encompassing ideological, political, economic, social-
cultural and defence factors, in which a weakness in anyone 
factor is seen as threatening the stability of the whole. 11 
This holistic or paranoic view of security serves to justify the 
expanded role of the military because almost anything can be seen 
as a threat to security. A violent crime, for instance, is not 
simply a matter for police investigation. It will attract close 
3 
scrutiny from military intelligence as it may have been committed 
to obtain funds for subversive activities or to discredi t the 
government. A natural disaster, such as a flood or an earthquake, 
is a threat to security because its economic impact may make 
people restless and dissatisfied. 
Anything that cannot be controlled or monitored closely is a 
potential threat to security. A western anthropologist in Irian 
Jaya, for instance, may highlight the backwardness of the people 
or show how traditional cuI ture is being eroded by Indonesian 
values. In the former case, Indonesia could be accused of 
neglecting the Irianese and in the latter case, of cultural 
imperialism. The anthropologist may also encourage pan-Melanesian 
or separatist sentiments in the people. It follows, therefore, 
that if the anthropologist obtained permission to undertake 
research in Irian Jaya, his or her movements would be monitored 
closely by military intelligence. Similarly, an Irianese refugee 
returning to Irian Jaya from Papua New Guinea would be required 
to report regularly to military authorities until the authorities 
were assured that the individual concerned had adopted a mental 
outlook consistent with the national philosophy.12 In the same 
vein, the considerable influence of tribal leaders and 
missionaries in Irian Jaya is accepted with reservation by 
military authorities in Irian Jaya. It is a sign that government 
control is yet to be accepted fully and thus an indication that 
development (in its comprehensive sense) is far from complete. 13 
What is the problem in Irian Jaya? Why is there an independence 
movement and why have many Irianese sought refuge in neighbouring 
4 
Papua New Guinea? The answer to these questions is partly related 
to the military's roles as a 'stabiliser' (maintainer of 
security) and 'dynamiser' (motivator of the population to achieve 
development goals). 
The close control that the military exerts over society, its 
intolerance to opposition and readiness to employ excessive force 
to maintain securi ty are matters that have adversely affected 
relations between the military and the people of Irian Jaya. 
Throughout Indonesia, there is little hesitation to employ force 
if, in the opinion of mi li tary commanders, securi ty is 
threatened. 14 For the mili tary, the necessi ty for tight control 
of the population is probably particularly important in Irian 
Jaya. The 'mental psychological' condition of the Irianese people 
is described as unstable and the Irianese are regarded as being 
easily misled by false promises whether from dishonest 
administrators or from dissident leaders. 15 The result is a 
tendency to act arbi trarily wi th relatively minor securi ty 
incidents attracting a disproportionately harsh military 
response .16 This reaction is not confined to Irian Jaya17 and 
serves to underline the gulf between the idealism espoused in 
statements of 'sacrifice' in the interests of the people and 'the 
unity of ABRI and the people' .18 
The second problem relates to the military's role of 'dynamiser' 
in the support of development programs. There is a belief that in 
order to achieve welfare goals and raise the economic prosperity 
of the people (and thereby improve securi ty) , there is a 
requirement to bring about a cultural transformation so that the 
5 
Irianese can accept development programs more 
on the part of the mili tary to effect change 
view of progress, as well as programs to 
readily.19 Efforts 
according to i ts 
enhance national 
integration like transmigration, 
dissatisfaction in the province. 
have led to considerable 
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Irian Jaya (formerly Dutch New Guinea and West Irian) is a 
sparcely-inhabi ted, rugged, inhospi table land covered by dense 
jungle and swamp. The 421,981 square kilometres of Irian Jaya 
represents 22 per cent of Indonesia's total land mass. 20 The 
population is around 1,600,000 less than one per cent of 
Indonesia's total population of 180 million. By contrast, Java 
with an area less than one third that of Irian Jaya has a 
population of over 100 million. 21 85 per cent of the population 
is nominally Christian and the remaining 15 per cent Moslem. 
Nationally, Indonesia is predominantly Islamic, with 87 per cent 
of the population adherents of Islam. 22 Irian Jaya is also home 
to 240 of Indonesia's 558 separate languages23 . 
How did the military arrive in Irian Jaya and what significance 
is the province to Indonesia? As noted below, the incorporation 
of Irian Jaya into Indonesia represented the final chapter in 
Indonesia's struggle against Dutch colonialism. In the view of 
Indonesian nationalists, cultural, racial, religious, development 
or historical differences between Irian Jaya and other parts of 
Indonesia were of little significance. In Indonesia's view, 
6 
independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 for the whole of 
the former Dutch East Indies, including Irian, and Indonesians 
struggled from 1945-49 to achieve independence for the whole of 
the archipelago. It seems inconceivable that Indonesia would ever 
allow Irian Jaya to become independent. For most Indonesians , 
this would be a betrayal of the struggle for independence and the 
first step in the disintegration of the national state. 
The Dutch arrived in Java in 1596 and gradually extended their 
influence to other islands. In 1828, the Dutch established an 
ill-fated settlement near Tri ton Bay in north-west New Guinea 
and, in response to anticipated British intrusion, took 
possession of New Guinea to 141 degrees east longitude in the 
name of the SuI tan of Tidore. 24 When the Netherlands eventually 
recognised the independence of Indonesia in 1949, the status of 
West Irian remained unresolved. The Netherlands and Indonesia 
agreed to maintain the status quo and resolve the political 
status of West Irian within one year. The Indonesian 
interpretation of this agreement was that West Irian would be 
incorporated into Indonesia after a year. The Dutch, however, 
interpreted the failure to reach a solution as providing for the 
continued maintenance of Dutch rule. 25 
The adverse conservative reaction to the dismemberment of its 
empire and a desire to provide an area for Eurasian colonisation 
were early factors in the Dutch decision to retain West Irian. 2 6 
The Dutch argued that the surrender of west Irian to the 
Indonesians was contrary to the interests of the Irianese people. 
In the Dutch view, Indonesia was an underdeveloped country and 
7 
did not possess the capital or the trained manpower to develop 
its own territory let alone West Irian. Most West Irianese, the 
Dutch argued, had never heard of Indonesia and should be allowed 
to decide their own future. 27 
Most Indonesian writers of the time mention Tidore's claim over 
New Guinea and the Dutch recognition of that claim, but this 
historical tie was of minor importance. 28 The question of West 
Irian was viewed as having been resolved in the struggle for 
independence, 1945-49. Nationalists maintained that they had 
struggled for the independence of the whole archipelago, not just 
part of it. 29 Indonesia's case rested primarily on the 
successor-state claim: Irian Jaya had formed part of the Dutch 
East Indies and the claim of the nationalist movement was 'to 
succeed to Dutch rule over the whole of Netherlands India'. 30 
Indonesia existed 'from Sabang to Merauke' and not from Sabang to 
Ambon. 31 
For generations, the Indonesians asserted, the Dutch interest in 
West Irian was to maintain a competitor-free buffer zone east of 
the lucrative spice islands. Their belated post-war concern about 
the rights of the Irianese people was colonialism under the guise 
of a mission sacree. 32 The question of cuI tural and racial 
differences was irrelevant to the Indonesians in view of the 
heterogeneous nature of Indonesia itself. 33 The argument of 
immaturity of the newly-independent Indonesia to govern West 
Irian effectively was also of little significance to the 
Indonesians. For Indonesia, it was a question of colonialism or 
independence. 34 While the Dutch held West Irian, the Indonesian 
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revolution was incomplete. 35 There was also an emotional 
attachment to West Irian that had been forged through the 
banishment of several prominent Indonesian nationalists to Tanah 
Merah on the Digul River from the late 1920s. Among these leaders 
was Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's first Vice President. 36 
Self-determination for the people of West Irian was of little 
importance to the Indonesian nationalists. If the same concept 
was applied to other regions of Indonesia, it could mean the 
acceptance of the disintegration of the Indonesian national 
state. 37 In Indonesia's view, it was Dutch intransigence that 
prevented the handing over of West Irian in 1949. The issue was 
one of national unity, not one of self-determination for the West 
Irianese people. 38 
Indonesia initially attempted to gain sovereignty over West Irian 
by diplomatic means. When diplomatic efforts failed, Indonesia 
adopted a policy of economic and mili tary pressure. Dutch 
enterprises were confiscated in 1957 but as economic measures 
failed to bring about a solution, Indonesia resolved to occupy 
West Irian by force. The Indonesian government built up the 
strength of its armed forces and sent missions abroad to purchase 
arms. 39 
The Dutch policy of self-determination for West Irian provoked a 
hostile response from Indonesia. In December 1961, in response to 
the organisation of the New Guinea Counci14o and the announcement 
of a Papuan flag and national anthem, President Sukarno 
proclaimed the Trikora or 'Three Commands of the People' 
~ 
9 
consisting of orders to 'prevent the formation of the Dutch 
colonial Puppet state of Papua, hoist the Indonesian flag in 
Irian and prepare a general mobilisation to defend Indonesia's 
independence and unity,.41 
The Mandala Command under Major-General (later President) Suharto 
was given the task of planning and executing the military 
operation to prevent the formation of the 'Dutch puppet state' in 
West Irian. Over several months, some 2,000 troops in small 
contingents were air-dropped or infiltrated by sea into West 
Irian where they operated with very limited success. 42 Meanwhile, 
planning proceeded for Operation Jayawijaya, a major conventional 
assault to capture Biak. 43 
The New York Agreement in August 1962 meant that the Indonesian 
assaul t perhaps fortunately for Indonesia44 did not 
eventuate. Under the Agreement, the United Nations Temporary 
Executi ve Authority (UNTEA) formed an interim government from 
August 1962 until the transfer of administrative authority to the 
Indonesian government in May 1963. 45 During this period, a United 
Nations Security Force (UNSF) consisting of Pakistani troops and 
the Dutch-formed Papuan Police and Papuan Volunteer Corps was 
responsible for security. The Indonesian guerilla fighters 
previously landed in West Irian were gathered together at several 
locations and unified under the name Kotindo or Indonesian 
Contingents. They were placed at the disposal of the United 
Nations to maintain law and order but in practice remained under 
the command of the Indonesian commander. 46 
10 
After the transfer of administration to Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Contingents were further augmented by staff and formed uni ts. 
This formed the basis of the Seventeenth Military Area Command or 
Kodam XVII/Irian Barat. In 1964, the name of the Kodam was 
changed to Kodam XVll/Cenderawasih and the motto Praja Ghupta 
Vira was conferred. Somewhat ironically, in view of later events, 
the motto means 'soldiers are the protectors of the people'. 
The New York Agreement also stipulated that the people of West 
Irian were to be given the choice of whether or not to remain 
with Indonesia. In 1969, a little over 1,000 representatives of 
the people expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia in the 
Act of Free Choice, an act described by one observer as an 
exercise in 'persuasion, intimidation and violence' . 47 Given that 
President Suharto had stated a few months before the Act that any 
decision by the people of West Irian to leave the Republic of 
Indonesia would be regarded as treason, the result was never in 
doubt.48 From the Indonesian viewpoint, the requirement under the 
1962 Agreement for an act of self-determination to be held before 
the end of 1969 was regarded as a denial of Indonesia's clai m 
that West Irian was an integral part of Indonesia. In Indonesia's 
view, the Irianese population had exercised its right of self-
determination in the August 1945 declaration of independence. 49 
In any case, international opinion was prepared to accept the Act 
as a fait accompli despite its obvious shortcomings. 5o 
In 1973, the province was renamed Irian Jaya. In 1985, as a 
resul t of a maj or reorganisation of the Army's structure, the 
Kodam was renamed Kodam Vlll/Trikora and became responsible for 
11 
the Moluccas as well as Irian Jaya. The birthday of Kodam VIII is 
celebrated (at least in military circles) on 1 August. 51 
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2. THE MILITARY ORGANISATION IN IRIAN JAYA 
This chapter explains that the numerical strength of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces in Irian Jaya is comparatively small and 
that military units in Irian Jaya are organised and dispersed to 
cope with internal security and nation-building tasks. Army units 
in the province are mainly locally-raised territorial units with 
a limi ted capability to conduct conventional warfare. The Navy 
and Air Force are virtually absent from the province. It is clear 
that the military in Irian Jaya is concerned with internal 
security and development programs rather than with external 
aggression. 
The number of Indonesian military personnel (including police ) i n 
Irian Jaya is around 10,000. Many reports erroneously put t he 
number of troops in Irian Jaya at far higher levels. 1 Th e 
tendency to overestimate the number of troops is understandable 
due to the many accounts of Indonesian mili tary operations in 
Irian Jaya and clashes between mili tary and dissident groups. 
Moreover, since Indonesia took control of the province in 1963, a 
large number of Irianese have sought refuge in neighbouring Papua 
New Guinea. Many of these people fled their homes because they 
were frightened of the military or fearful of becoming involved 
in mili tary operations directed against dissident elements. The 
frequent accounts of separatist activity and military operations 
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in Irian Jaya add to the impression of a large military presence 
in the province. 
The expectation that Indonesia has large numbers of troops in 
Irian Jaya is fuelled by a belief in some quarters that Indonesia 
has expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea. 2 The view of an 
expansionist Indonesia is no more stronger than in Papua New 
Guinea. 3 As a corollary, it is easy to credit the Indonesian 
Armed Forces in Irian Jaya with the capability to invade Papua 
New Guinea, should there be sufficient reason to do SO.4 The 
reality is that the armed forces in the province are relatively 
thin on the ground and are organised to deal with internal 
threats rather than to mount external ventures. Without 
substantial reinforcements, Indonesia's military forces in Irian 
Jaya do not represent a threat to Papua New Guinea. 
The picture of the strength and organisation of the military in 
Irian Jaya is clouded by contradictory claims regarding security 
in the province. On the one hand, Indonesian spokesmen claim that 
separatist elements do not exist or are an irrelevance whilst, on 
the other hand, separatist leaders claim an armed following of 
tens of thousands. Neither claim can be accepted at face value. 
The number of military personnel in Irian Jaya provides an 
indication that armed rebellion in the province is not of the 
same magnitude as that faced in East Timor. In the mid-1970s, for 
example, Indonesia deployed around 30,000 troops to East Timor5 
to combat armed insurrection and today maintains relatively large 
numbers of combat troops in East Timor. This is not to say that 
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there is little or no opposition to the Indonesian government in 
Irian Jaya. Rather, as will be seen in chapter 3, the generally 
negative impact of the military on the people of Irian Jaya 
appears to be out of proportion to its numerical strength. 
Based on the organisational framework of the mili tary in Irian 
Jaya outlined in this chapter, it is possible to make tentative, 
but relatively informed, judgements concerning some of the 
reports of Indonesian military activities and operations in Irian 
Jaya. Some such judgements are made towards the end of this 
chapter. 
INTRODUCTION 
The organisation of the military in Irian Jaya may be more easily 
comprehended with some introductory remarks about the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (ABRI) and the administrative entities that comprise 
the civil government in Indonesia. 
ABRI consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police. Together , 
the four services have a strength of about 480,000 personnel. 6 
The Army, with around 215,000 personnel,7 is the senior service 
in terms of numerical strength and influence. The Indonesian Army 
is predominantly an infantry force of around 80 infantry 
battalions consisting of three primary commands. 8 
The Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) is the conventional 
mi Ii tary force responsible for the defence of Indonesia. 
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Kostrad's organisation is based on platoons (wi th a personnel 
strength of about 35), companies (150) and battalions (700).9 An 
infantry battalion from Kostrad consists of three rifle companies 
(each of which has three platoons), a support company and a 
headquarters company. The support and headquarters companies 
provide the battalion's integral fire support and logistic 
support. A brigade contains three battalions and has a numerical 
strength of around 3,000 whilst a division normally contains 
three brigades and numbers around 10,000. 10 
Kostrad has two divisions each containing airborne and infantry 
brigades with integrated combat (armour, artillery and engineer 
units) and service support (such as transport, workshop, and 
supply units). One of Kostrad's airborne brigades, with dedicated 
naval and air support, maintains a high state of readiness for 
short notice deployments. Wi th the exception of one brigade in 
Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, Kostrad is based on Java. However, 
from references to troops with 'green berets' operating in Irian 
Jaya, it is clear that Kostrad battalions or companies are 
assigned to Irian Jaya from time to time for specified tasks or 
tours of operation. 11 
The Special Forces Command (Kopassus) is also based on Java and 
consists of around 4,000 personnel comprising two special force 
groups, a counter-terrorist detachment plus integrated combat, 
service and training uni ts. Special force soldiers receive 
training in commando, amphibious and airborne operations but also 
operate in standard infantry roles in company-size units. 12 They 
wear the red beret and are the successor organisation to 
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Kopassandha. Special force troops often operate in small teams 
and, from the numerous references to paracommandos and 'red 
berets' (invariably associated with brutality), are no strangers 
to service in Irian Jaya. 13 
63 of the Army's 80 battalions are allocated to the 10 military 
area commands, known as Kodam. 14 Uni ts under Kodam control are 
generally not as well trained or equipped as units from Kostrad 
or Kopassus. The Kodams are responsible for 'terri torial 
development' which encompasses anything from internal securi ty 
duties to training the population to defend the nation. The 
battalions assigned to the Kodams are referred to as territorial 
battalions. These battalions have four rifle companies but no 
support company. This is an indication that their task is one of 
internal securi ty and terri torial development rather than 
conventional warfare. It also reflects the dispersal of the 
companies within the battalion's geographic area of operations. 
The integral fire support provided by a support company is not 
required if the battalion is not concentrated. 
As far as I can ascertain, there are no Kostrad units or Kopassus 
troops based permanently in Irian Jaya .15 The military's 
organisation and presence in Irian Jaya is thus based on the 
Army's Kodam or territorial structure, a network common to all 
provinces of Indonesia. 
The territorial structure extends from the military area command 
(Kodam) to military sub-area commands (Korem) and thence to 
military district commands (Kodim) and military sub-district 
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commands (Koramil). The lowest level of contact and control is 
the village management NCO (Babinsa) who is allocated a number of 
villages and reports to a mili tary sub-district command. 16 The 
organisations of a Kodam, Korem, Kodim and Koramil are shown in 
Figures 1_4.17 
The civil administration in Indonesia flows from the national 
government to 27 provincial governments. The provincial 
governments administer the provinces through a number of 
regencies (kabupaten) which are further sub-divided into a number 
of sub-districts (kecama tan). Sub-district heads report to 
regents who in turn are responsible to the provincial governor. 
Irian Jaya is divided into nine regencies which are further 
divided into 121 sub-districts. 1 8 The regency boundaries in 
Irian Jaya are shown in Map 2. As described below, the military's 
terri torial organisation in Irian Jaya is based on these civil 
boundaries. 
ARMY 
The Eighth Military Area Command (Kodam VIII) is responsible for 
Irian Jaya and Mal uku (See Map 3). Its commander, a maj or-
general, has his headquarters in Jayapura and commands the 
military and police assets in the two provinces. Kodam VIII 
consists of four Korems (three of which are located in Irian 
Jaya), 14 Kodims (nine in Irian Jaya) and seven battalions (four 
in Irian Jaya) . 
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The Army units in Kodam VIII are as followS: 19 
Kodam Vili/Trikora 
Kodim 1701 (Independent) 
733 infantry battalion 
one out-of-area battalion 
5 combat engineer detachment 
10 combat engineer detachment 
Infantry training schools 
Korem 171/Praja Vira Tana 
Kodim 1703 
Kodim 1704 
Kodim 1706 
HQ 752 infantry battalion 
Korem 172/Praja Vira Yakti 
Kodim 1702 
Kodim 1707 
HQ 751 infantry battalion 
Korem 173/Praja Vira Braja 
Kodim 1705 
Kodim 1708 
Kodim 1709 
HQ 753 infantry battalion 
Korem 174/Pattimura 
Kodim 1501 
Kodim 1502 
Kodim 1503 
Kodim 1504 
Kodim 1505 
HQ 731 infantry battalion 
HQ 732 infantry battalion 
Jayapura 
Jayapura 
Ambon (mobile battalion) 
location & status unknown 
Ambon 
Waena (Jayapura) 
Ifargunung (Jayapura) and 
Suli (Ambon) 
Manokwari 
Manokwari 
Sorong 
Fakfak 
Sorong 
Abepura (Jayapura) 
Wamena 
Merauke 
Sentani (Jayapura) 
Biak 
Nabire 
Biak 
Serui 
Nabire 
Ambon 
Ternate 
Masohi 
Tual 
Ambon 
Namlea 
Masohi 
Ternate 
The headquarters of the four Korems in Kodam VIII are located at 
Manokwari, Abepura (Jayapura) and Biak in Irian Jaya, and Ambon 
in Maluku (See Map 3). Each of the three Korems in Irian Jaya is 
responsible for three regencies. Korem 171 in Manokwari, for 
example, commands the Army assets in the regencies of Manokwari , 
Sorong, and Fakfak in the north-west of the province. The Korems 
are commanded by colonels. 
Each of the three Korems in Irian Jaya is sub-divided into three 
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Kodims. The Kodim boundaries correspond to the civil regency 
boundaries. The geographical boundaries of the three Kodims in 
Korem 171, for example, correspond to the boundaries of Sorong, 
Manokwari and Fakfak regencies as shown in Map 2. The 
headquarters of Kodim 1703, Kodim 1704 and Kodim 1706 are 
located in the regency capitals at Manokwari, Sorong and Fakfak 
respectively. Kodims are commanded by lieutenant-colonels. 
The number of Koramils per Kodim is related to the number of sub-
districts within each regency. For example, Merauke regency with 
18 sub-districts could be expected to have 18 Koramils. 2o 
The terri torial organisation in Irian Jaya can be pictured as 
follows: 
Kodam 
Korem 
Kodim 
Koramil 
conunanded by: 
major general 
colonel 
lieutenant colonel 
junior officer 
consists of: 
2 provinces 
3 regencies 
1 regency 
1 sub-district 
There are seven infantry battalions in Kodam VIII, four based in 
Irian Jaya and three in Maluku. Of the four battalions in Irian 
Jaya, three are permanently based in Irian Jaya whilst the fourth 
battalion is assigned for a few years from another Kodam or from 
one of Kostrad's brigades. Of the three battalions in Maluku, one 
is the Kodam's ready reaction force and as such receives priority 
in training, personnel and equipment. 21 
Each of the three Korems in Irian Jaya has been allotted one 
battalion: 752 battalion to Korem 171, 751 battalion to Korem 172 
and 753 battalion to Korem 173. Korem 174 in Maluku commands two 
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battalions. 22 These five infantry battalions are described as 
'dispersed' territorial infantry battalions because their 
companies are dispersed within the boundaries of the Korem. For 
example, the companies of 751 battalion under command of Korem 
172 in Jayapura, are dispersed within Kodim 1701 (Jayapura), 
Kodim 1702 (Wamena) and Kodim 1707 (Merauke) along the 750 
kilometre border with Papua New Guinea. One of the companies of 
751 battalion is located permanently in Merauke. 23 This company 
is allocated platoon, section or sub-section tasks within the 
Koramils of Kodim 1707 (Merauke). 24 In theory, the company is 
under command of 751 battalion in Jayapura but in practice its 
activi ties are coordinated largely by the Kodim commander in 
Merauke. 25 
The three territorial battalions in Irian Jaya are manned by 
Irianese troops but most officers are from outside the province. 
In 1988, for example, 85 percent of the personnel in 752 
battalion at Sorong were Irianese. 26 The territorial battalions 
rarely, if ever, exercise as a battalion and cannot be considered 
as possessing the combat power or cohesion of a Kostrad 
battalion. 
At any given time a fourth, non-Irianese, battalion is assigned 
to Irian Jaya for a few years before being rotated with another 
out-of-area battalion. 27 This battalion could be a terri torial 
battalion from another Kodam or a battalion from one of the 
brigades of Kostrad. 28 The command status, location and 
identification of the out-of-area battalion is difficult to 
determine. From the scanty details available, it appears that the 
28 
out-of-area battalion is rotated within Korem 172 in Jayapura 
regency during its presumed 2-3 year tenure in Irian Jaya. It is 
not known how long an out-of-area battalion will continue to be 
assigned to Irian Jaya, whether future out-of-area battalions 
will be located in Korem 172, or whether the out-of-area 
battalion is commanded by a Korem or Kodam VIII. 
The Kodam commander has one infantry battalion earmarked as his 
regional ready reaction force. This battalion is described as a 
I" ~ 'centralised' territorial infantry battalion as its sub-units or 
companies are co-located. Within Kodam VIII, the mobile, para-
trained 733 battalion in Ambon performs this task providing the 
initial reserve to deal with situations beyond the capability of 
III the 'dispersed' territorial battalions. Figures 5 and 6 show the 
organisations of battalions based in Irian Jaya. 2 9 
As noted above, additional forces are assigned to Irian Jaya for 
the conduct of special operations. Such forces are likely to 
include elements from Kostrad or Kopassus. 
Exclusive of any additional forces, I estimate that the number of 
Army personnel in Irian Jaya is in the order of 5,000. 30 
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'II 
"I The Indonesian Navy's Western Fleet operates out of Jakarta, its 
1., 
Eastern Fleet out of Surabaya. The Navy has no major ships 
stationed permanently in Irian Jaya. The largest naval base 
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within Kodam VIII is at Ambon. The Ambon base is classified as a 
primary naval base (Lantamal) and reports to Eastern Fleet 
headquarters in Surabaya. The primary naval base in Ambon is 
commanded by a naval colonel. 
The waters around southern Irian Jaya and the Aru Islands are 
rich in fish, prawns and squid. One of the Navy's main tasks is 
to ensure foreign fishing vessels are licensed to fish in 
Indonesian waters. In the decade between 1979 and 1988, 98 
foreign (mainly Taiwanese) fishing vessels were apprehended in 
east Indonesian waters. 31 Other naval responsibili ties include 
the prevention of smuggling and fishing using explosives and 
poisons. 32 The commander of primary naval base Ambon is 
responsible for search and rescue and commands a small maritime 
security task force assisted by light reconnaissance aircraft to 
maintain securi ty at sea. 33 Ambon also assists larger securi ty 
or combat task forces from Surabaya which periodically stage 
through its area of responsibili ty. The Kodam commander is 
advised of naval activities in the area through a Navy liaison 
officer (a colonel) on the Kodam headquarters. 
Naval depots or stations (Sional) are located at Jayapura, Sarong 
and Biak in Irian Jaya, and Tual in the Kai Islands of south-east 
Maluku. 34 Naval support and repair facilities are also located in 
Manokwari and Merauke. 35 The naval stations report to Ambon and 
are commanded by Navy lieutenant-colonels. 36 They command a small 
support staff and are responsible for the maintenance of their 
modest facility, the reception of visiting ships and minor off-
shore maritime security duties. 
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AIR FORCE 
Kodam VIII forms part of the Air Force's Operational Command 11 
(headquartered in Ujung Pandang) which is responsible for eastern 
Indonesia. 37 As almost all of Indonesia's Air Force assets are 
located on Java, Irian Jaya is of little significance in terms of 
air power. There are no fighter- bomber aircraft stationed 
permanently in the province although fighter or interceptor 
aircraft stationed on Java exercise in the area. 38 For example, 
the deployment and use of OV-I0 counter-insurgency aircraft 
against villages in Irian Jaya is well documented. 39 
The Air Force assets in the province - comprising three Puma 
helicopters and a Cessna aircraft40 are supplemented by 
civilian or missionary aircraft. Missionary aircraft playa major 
role in the movement of supplies and personnel, including 
assistance to the civil and military authorities in Irian Jaya. 41 
Missionary aircraft are sometimes hired to rotate mili tary 
personnel in isolated postS. 42 
The main Air Force bases in Irian Jaya are located at Sentani 
near Jayapura and Manuhua at Biak. Merauke is another airbase of 
some importance. These airbases are commanded by Air Force 
lieutenant-colonels assisted by a small number of support and 
base protection staff. 43 Pattimura airfield at Ambon is a 
commercial airfield useful as a stopover location between Java 
and Jayapura or Biak. A regular C-130 (Hercules aircraft) courier 
service operates into Irian Jaya for logistic support and 
occasional civic action tasks. The Kodam commander is informed of 
I 
f I 
I 
1< 1 
, I: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I" ~ 
j, 
I 
I" 
1\ 
:1 
III 
I 
l~1 
31 
air movements through an Air Force liaison officer (a colonel) on 
the Kodam headquarters. 
POLICE 
The police in Indonesia have the usual range of responsibilities 
of western police forces. They are responsible for law and order, 
investigations and traffic control whilst specialists receive 
training in riot control. Both Irian Jaya and Maluku province 
form police areas (Polda) commanded by an area police chief of 
colonel rank. The area police chiefs are located in Jayapura and 
Ambon and command the police assets in their respective provinces 
from a headquarters similar in size to that of a Korem 
commander's. At these police headquarters, police majors or 
lieutenant-colonels command directorates responsible for security 
and intelligence, criminal investigation, crime prevention, riot 
control, traffic, personnel and logistics. 
There are nine police sub-areas (Polres) in Irian Jaya 
corresponding to the nine regencies in the province. Police sub-
areas are commanded by lieutenant-colonels and are in turn 
divided into police sectors (Polsek) commanded by junior 
officers. The 121 police sectors in Irian Jaya correspond with 
the number of sub-districts in the province. 44 The police sub-
area and sector headquarters are located in the various regency 
and sub-district capitals. 
In Maluku province, there are four sub-areas located in the four 
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regencies of the province and 55 police sectors located in the 
sub-districts of the regencies. 45 The police sector of Tobelo in 
the North Maluku sub-area, for example, is responsible for 30 
villages, 32 islands and 37,000 people. Additionally, there is a 
police maritime patrol unit with several patrol boats and a 
police training school in Ambon. The school trains non-
commissioned officers from Irian Jaya and other provinces, as 
well as civil securi ty personnel. 46 Given around 20 police per 
police sector,47 the number of police in Maluku province is 
unlikely to exceed 2,000 personnel. 
Similarly, the number of police in Irian Jaya, taking into 
account training units such as the police school in Jayapura and 
elements of police mobile brigades located in the province, is 
probably in the order of 3,500. 48 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY 
The above organisation and structure of Indonesia's armed forces 
in Irian Jaya can provide a framework from which to evaluate 
reports of Indonesian military activity in the province (or 
across the border in Papua New Guinea). This framework, combined 
with some knowledge of military procedures (such as the fact that 
general elections invariably herald an increased military 
presence and activity), 49 can assist in formulating tentative 
judgements concerning reported military activity in Irian Jaya. 
For example, it was reported that 700 Indonesian troops were 
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deployed to the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border in 197850 and 
that 150 Indonesian troops crossed the border into Papua New 
Guinea in 1984. 51 Leaving aside the question of the reliability 
of this information, these reports are credible at first glance 
based purely on the fact that Indonesian companies are 150 
strong, Indonesian battalions are 700 strong, and company or 
battalion-size units are likely to be allocated operational tasks 
along the border. For internal security operations on the border, 
however, it is most likely that the companies of a battalion 
I"~ would operate relatively independently. In other words, it would 
w 
be unlikely that the rifle companies of the battalion would to be 
concentrated in one location. 
As a second example, it was reported in 1984 that 53 Indonesian 
soldiers destroyed crops and garden huts at Suwampa in Papua New 
Guinea. Indonesia denied the incursion claiming that the 
offenders were OPM guerillas in Indonesian Army uniforms. 52 Where 
did the offenders come from? As all but three of the troops 
involved were reportedly non-Melanesians, it is difficult to 
credit the Indonesian claim. Indonesian soldiers from 751 
I 
battalion in Korem 172 where the incident occurred are 
predominantly Melanesian, so it is most unlikely that soldiers 
from this terri torial battalion were involved. Moreover, many 
Melanesian soldiers from 751 battalion had earlier deserted and 
II 
crossed into Papua New Guinea following disturbances in 
Jayapura. 53 It is even less likely, therefore, that troops from 
this same unit would be involved in a cross-border operation. 
III 
The soldiers who razed Suwampa may have come from the out-of-area 
battalion based in Irian Jaya. More likely, however, they were 
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Kostrad or Kopassus troops sent to Irian Jaya for security 
operations associated with the upsurge of dissident activity in 
Irian Jaya in 1983 and the planned uprising by West Papuan 
independence supporters in February 1984. 54 The odd number of 
soldiers involved (53 soldiers or platoon plus strength) provides 
an indication of the involvement of special force troops 
(Kopassus). Soldiers from Kopassus are the most likely troops to 
form 'task forces' tailored to a specific mission. 55 Moreover, as 
Kopassus soldiers appear to be deployed to Irian Jaya in 100-man 
companies,56 50 non-Melanesian troops neatly comprise one half of 
a special force company. 
Third, based on the organisation of Korem 174 in Ambon (see 
p.25), a report that 'four battalions of paratroops and two of 
marines had been brought in (to Irian Jaya in 1977) from the 
mili tary complex at Ambon' 57 appears dubious. 733 battalion in 
Ambon, the mobile battalion of Kodam VIII, is the only para-
trained battalion permanently located in Maluku province (of 
which Ambon is the capital). The two other battalions in Maluku, 
731 and 732 battalions, are terri torial battalions. These two 
battalions are dispersed throughout Korem 174 and are unlikely to 
be para-trained. But even if they were para-trained, it is 
doubtful that all the troops in Maluku would be sent to Irian 
Jaya simultaneously. Other queries arise: why four para-trained 
battalions, given that three battalions usually form an airborne 
brigade? And why marine battalions? It is possible that four 
battalions of paratroops from Kostrad and two marine battalions 
staged through Ambon (the main naval base within Kodam VIII) from 
Java, Sulawesi or previous deployment in East Timor en route to 
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Irian Jaya, although the deployment of this number of troops 
would be unusual. 
As a final example, reports that 5,000, 10,000 or 15,000 
Indonesian troops (presumably brought in from outside the 
province) were operating in the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border 
area in 1976 and 197758 are difficul t to credit at the higher 
range, although it is clear that substantial reinforcements were 
deployed to Irian Jaya in association with widespread unrest and 
the national elections in 1977. Reinforcements of 10,000 or more 
(division to division plus strength) would place a severe strain 
on mili tary resources both within and wi thout Kodam VIII. 
Questions arise concerning troop availabili ty (in view of 
Indonesia's preoccupation with East Timor), the level of threat 
to warrant the deployment, and the military's ability to 
establish a viable command and control network to support such a 
deployment. The transportation, resupply, housing and costs 
involved in the protracted deployment of such large numbers of 
troops raise further queries. 59 It is more likely that an 
additional battalion (700 troops) or, at most, a brigade (three 
battalions plus integral support numbering around 3,000) would be 
brought to the province for a major counter-insurgency operation. 
The deployment of even a brigade, however, would strain the 
province's infrastructure considerably.6o 
SUMMARY 
Overall, the number of military personnel in Irian Jaya is around 
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9,000 made up of 5,000 Army, 3,500 Police and 500 Navy and Air 
Force personnel. This number could rise depending on periodic 
deployments from outside the province but is unlikely to exceed 
10,000 at any particular time. 61 Three out of the four battalions 
permanently located in Irian Jaya are manned by Irianese troops 
and dispersed on internal security and development tasks. A 
fourth, non-Irianese, battalion is assigned to Irian Jaya for a 
being rotated with another out-of-area few years 
battalion. 
to Irian 
before 
Additional forces from Kostrad and Kopassus are sent 
Jaya for the conduct of operations. There are no 
artillery or anti-aircraft uni ts in the large area covered by 
Indonesia's two easternmost provinces, Maluku and Irian Jaya. 62 
Merauke regency, located in the south-east corner of Irian Jaya 
and covering an area almost twice the size of Tasmania, is 
garrisoned by one infantry company. 
The Navy has no ships stationed permanently in Irian Jaya and the 
nearest primary naval base is at Ambon which reports to Eastern 
Fleet headquarters in Surabaya, Java. Small naval stations, which 
report to Ambon, are located in Irian Jaya's major coastal towns. 
Almost all of Indonesia's aircraft are located on Java and the 
Air Force operational command responsible for eastern Indonesia 
is located in Sulawesi. The main Air Force bases in Irian Jaya 
house helicopters and light aircraft and the military is largely 
dependent on missionary aircraft for transportation to isolated 
areas. Combat aircraft are deployed to Irian Jaya for operations 
and training flights. 
Two interrelated conclusions arise from this summation. First, 
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the dearth of conventional military forces (Kostrad, Kopassus), 
combat arms (artillery, anti- aircraft and armoured units), 
aircraft and ships, as well as the dispersal of the territorial 
battalions throughout Irian Jaya provides an indication that the 
military is concerned more with internal, rather than external, 
threats. In other words, Indonesia does not appear to foresee an 
external threat arising from Papua New Guinea or northern 
Australia, at least in the short term. 
Second, given the strength and calibre of Army troops in Irian 
Jaya, combined with the very limited naval and air support, the 
military in Irian Jaya has an extremely limited capacity for 
offensive action. There would need to be a substantial and 
prolonged reinforcement of ships, aircraft and troops before 
Indonesia could pose a military threat from Irian Jaya to its 
near neighbours. 
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Figure 2. Military Sub-Area Command (Korem) Headquarters1 
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Figure 3. Military District Command (Kodim) Headquarters1 
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Figure 4. Military Sector Command (Koramil) Headquarters 
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Figure 5. Organisation of Territorial Infantry Battalions 
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Figure 6. Organisation of an Infantry Battalion (Brigaded)l 
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Sydney, 1985 , pp . 74, 97, 98 , 101 , 141 , 147, 150, 153 , 154, 180 ; 
Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia Since Sukarno, Asia Pacific 
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4, 1987, p.43, wrote that Indonesia launched Operation Saute 
(sic) in 1986 with five divisions. As this would involve the 
deployment of 50-75,000 troops, the use of the word division is 
presumably in error. 
61. A written request to the commander of Kodam VIII for, inter 
alia, the numerical strength of the Indonesian Armed Forces in 
Irian Jaya was unanswered. 
62. I also found no reference to armoured uni ts in Indonesian 
sources. However, in Tapol, OPe cit., p.23, there is reference 
to 'Indonesian tank-borne troops' operating in 1963. Brian May, 
The Indonesian Tragedy, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1978, 
p. 178, notes the presence of 'an armoured car' in 1969, 
presumably in Jayapura. Osborne, OPe cit., p.45, notes the use of 
'armoured cars' to disperse protestors in 1969, again presumably 
in Jayapura. More recently, Monbiot, Ope cit., p.218, mentions 
the presence of 'armoured cars' in Jayapura. It thus appears 
there is a light armoured car unit in Jayapura, but no tanks. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY IN IRIAN JAYA 
This chapter examines the objectives of the military in Irian 
Jaya and the implementation of development policies. A major 
concern of the military in Irian Jaya is to maintain security so 
that development programs can proceed unhindered. Problems arise 
in the pursui t of this goal because security is maintained by 
excessive resort to force and because the military's view of 
development has both a physical and a mental dimension. Attempts 
to inculcate in the Irianese a mental attitude amenable to 
military ideas of progress and development, combined with efforts 
to enhance national integration through transmigration, have 
caused dissatisfaction. Slow progress in the difficul t task of 
building infrastructure and providing services in isolated, 
inland areas has added to the dissatisfaction. The perception of 
neglect, the climate of contempt and unfair competition, and 
heavy-handed methods to enforce security, have contributed to a 
feeling of alienation which, in its most extreme form, is 
expressed in armed rebellion. 
MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN IRIAN JAYA 
In the absence of any definitive statement,l military objectives 
in Irian Jaya must be discerned from official statements, known 
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obj ectives under the terri torial development program, the 
operation of securi ty and social-poli tical organisations, 
military operations and the attitude of the military towards the 
people. 
Official military statements provide an indication of the role of 
the mili tary in Indonesia, and by analogy, in Irian Jaya, yet 
need to be treated with some caution. As noted in chapter 1, 
there is a gulf between the idealism espoused in stated 
objectives and the harsh reality of policy implementation in the 
province. 
One objective is 'to supervise and prod the civil authorities , 2 
and to motivate the population to achieve development goals. 
Another objective is to be accepted and supported by the people 
because Indonesia's defence doctrine is based on the people and 
the armed forces defending the nation in concert. 3 These 
objectives are encompassed under the term 'territorial 
development' . 
Kodam commanders, including the commander of Kodam VIII , are 
responsible for territorial development within their military 
area command. 4 Territorial development aims to foster national 
resilience or a condition in which the people are imbued with a 
desire to support the national ideology, the government and its 
policies. Territorial development also involves training the 
people to defend the nation and the implementation of civic 
action programs to create a sense of unity between the people and 
the armed forces. 5 
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Indonesia's system of total people's defence and securi ty 
(Sishankamrata) is based on the armed forces and the people 
combining to defeat an invader who has succeeded in breaching 
Indonesia's conventional defences through guerilla warfare and a 
'never surrender' policy. 6 The trained popul ation (rakya t 
terlatih) is made up of three organisations: people's resistance 
(wanra), people's security (Kamra), and civil defence (Hansip).7 
The people's resistance is controlled by the Army. In war, 
people's resistance uni ts would provide reinforcements for 
regular units, collect intelligence, guard vital installations 
and harass the enemy. People's security is an organisation of 
police auxiliaries trained by the police to assist with the 
maintenance of law and order at village level. Civil defence, 
controlled by the provincial government with technical assistance 
from ABRI, is responsible for routine civil defence tasks such as 
assistance in the event of natural disasters as well as 
'neighbourhood watch' functions. 8 
In theory, each village in Irian Jaya should contain a IO-man 
section of people's resistance as well as sections of people's 
security and civil defence. 30-man platoons of people's 
resistance, people's security and civil defence should be 
available in sub-district capitals (for example, Tanahmerah in 
Merauke regency) and 150-man companies of the three organisations 
in regency capitals (such as Merauke).9 
From the fragmentary reports to hand, it is clear that the 
organisation of the 'trained population' in Irian Jaya is a 
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distant goal rather than a reality. The provincial head of civil 
defence - an infantry lieutenant-colonel - attributed the problem 
in euphemistic terms to 'personnel and organisational 
problems' .10 The Kodam commander has spoken of the need to raise 
the quantity and quality of military personnel in Irian Jaya and 
of the necessi ty to provide the required facili ties, financial 
support and transportation before the population can be trained 
effectively.11 The apparent difficul ty in obtaining grass roots 
support for the 'trained population' doctrine provides an 
indication of the gap between the people and the military. 
There is far more information available on civic action 
operations in Irian Jaya, presumably because of their utility in 
public relations. These operations are aimed at assisting 
development but have the equally important objective of uniting 
the military and the people .12 They are referred to as AMD 
operations (ABRI Masuk Desa: 'ABRI returns to the villages'). A 
large operation in 1990 involved five company-sized groups 
operating in five regencies (Kodim) over a three-week period. 13 
As with development, the obj ectives of AMD operations are both 
physical and ideological. Aside from the construction or 
refurbishment of infrastructure, national awareness, welfare and 
defence goals are pursued. 14 Areas chosen for civic action tasks 
may have some or all of the following characteristics: a 
relatively low level of development, rawan (insecure) in security 
terms, strategically located in geographically terms and 
identified in regional development programs as suitable for 
development projects. 1S The civic action programs may offset some 
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of the negative aspects of internal security operations, heavy-
handedness and intolerance although they may also exacerbate 
them. In any case, the duplication of development programs and 
competing priorities of civil and mili tary bodies must add to 
the complexi ty of coordinating development acti vi ties in Irian 
Jaya. 16 
The organisation and operation of several securi ty and social-
political organisations in Irian Jaya confirms the stress placed 
on the maintenance of securi ty (through the collection of 
intelligence) as well as the influence, scope and pervasiveness 
of the military in the province. 
As the chairman of the Area Co-ordinating Body for the 
Maintenance of National Security (Bakorstanasda), the commander 
of Kodam VIII is responsible for the maintenance of security in 
Irian Jaya and Maluku. 17 Bakorstanas became operational in April 
1989 as the successor organisation to the Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Public Order (Kopkamtib). It is 
considered by the mili tary to be more flexible and more 
representative than its predecessor body and presumably less 
likely to draw domestic or international criticism. 1 8 
The regional body in Jayapura is made up of around 10 permanent 
members, a small secretariat and a number of provincial 
department heads (Kakanwil) as non-permanent members who can be 
called upon for advice or assistance according to the matter 
under consideration. The permanent members include the Kodam 
commander, the provincial governor, the senior government legal 
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representative, the area police chief, representatives from the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force appointed by the Kodam commander, and 
the Korem commanders. 19 
The main concern of Bakorstanas is internal securi ty and 
Bakorstanas is responsible to ensure that development programs 
proceed unhindered by anti-government and anti-Pancasila 
elements. 20 The 'screening' of public servants to ensure they are 
untainted by previous involvement in 'extreme organisations' 
(such as the communist party and, presumably, the Free Papua 
Movement) is a maj or preoccupation of the body. 21 The commander 
of Kodam VIII has warned against the latent danger of communism 
and subversion, problems arising from the misuse of weapons, 
explosives and communications, as well as the need to make the 
government apparatus more effective and responsible. The latter 
remark can be interpreted as a mild expression for eradicating 
corruption and inefficiency.22 
The consul tative and coordinative forum known as the Area 
Leader's Conference (Muspida) enables military authorities to 
influence decision-making and decision implementation at both 
provincial and regency level. 23 At the provincial level in Irian 
Jaya, the governor, Kodam commander, area police chief and senior 
legal officer meet regularly to coordinate the implementation of 
government policy and development programs as well as to assess 
the security situation. 24 Similar representatives attend the Area 
Leader's Conference in Maluku province where the Kodam commander 
is represented by the commander of Korem 174. At regency level, 
the regent, Kodim commander, head of the police sub-area, and the 
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regency's legal officer conduct a similar consultative forum. In 
1988, five of the nine regents in Irian Jaya were military 
appointees. 25 
The commander of Kodam VIII is also Chairman of the Social 
Political Council of Area 'H' (Dewan Sosial Politik Daerah 'H') 
covering Irian Jaya and Maluku. As such, he chairs the board that 
selects military and police personnel for non-military 
appointments in the Kodam. Such appointments include, for 
example, one-fifth of the seats in the provincial and district 
parliaments,26 thereby ensuring that the military is well placed 
to monitor and influence policy. 
From the perspective of the implementation of military authority, 
military operations to maintain or restore security provide the 
clearest indication of why the indigenous inhabitants have been 
reluctant to accept the authority of the Indonesian government. 27 
From the beginning, the military acted more like conquerors than 
liberators. 28 The frequency of military operations is indicative 
of the friction between the Indonesian administration and the 
Irianese population, or at least a considerable proportion of 
it. 29 The operations appear to involve a disproportionate use of 
military force following isolated security incidents and include 
collective punishment against villages. 3o Far from improving 
securi ty, mili tary operations probably have the effect of 
swelling the ranks of the dissatisfied. 31 
Soon after the transfer of the province to Indonesia in 1963, the 
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military became involved in operations against the Arfak people 
in the Manokwari area from 1965 to 1969. 32 In 1967, in the course 
of these operations, Indonesian troops killed at least 200 
rebellious tribesmen in the Bird's Head area and the Air Force 
strafed Manokwari, resul ting in the deaths of 40 people 
(according to the estimate of the military commander).33 In 1968, 
operations continued in the Bird's Head region against Arfak 
tribesmen led by the Mandatjan brothers and Frits Awom. 34 
In April 1969, prior to the Act of Free Choice, a revolt broke 
out in the Enarotali area of the western highlands. It involved 
an uprising of tribesmen augmented by 95 indigenous police 
deserters. 35 Pay and other grievances provided a spark for the 
rebellion but it also appears that the people wanted to decide 
their own future 'free from Javanese pressure,.36 
Military operations continued throughout the 1970s. In May 1970, 
troops were airlifted from Java to the Baliem Valley in the 
central highlands to launch an operation against rebel 
tribesmen. 37 Dissident activity recurred in 1977 and 1978 in the 
central highlands, Tembagapura and along the border, associated 
wi th the general election in 1977, modernisation campaigns and 
the alienation of land. 38 The subsequent military operations 
included the bombing and strafing of villages and reports of 
napalm use. 39 Operations in the central highlands in 1977 
resulted in the deaths of 250 people and the postponement of 
voting. 4o 
Operation Clean Sweep in 1981 in the central highlands and 
I 
l 
d 
I 
I 
I 
Ill: 
, 
I' I 
,'I 
iIi 
I 
III 
II 
~ 
_JI 
58 
Jayapura regency reportedly involved the bombardment of villages 
and large-scale loss of life. 41 The 1984 disturbances in Jayapura 
included the desertion of around 100 soldiers from 751 battalion, 
many of whom crossed into Papua New Guinea. 42 
Irianese animosity to the Indonesian administration and the 
military appears to be substantial. 43 The disillusionment with 
Indonesian administration dates from well before the 1969 Act of 
Free Choice. In 1965, for example, a leader of the former New 
Guinea Council complained of midnight arrests, beatings and 
shootings of Papuan nationalists. 44 In 1967, indigenous Irianese 
representatives of the national parliament demanded the 
wi thdrawal of 'rocket and other military installations' and an 
end to strafing and rocket attacks on villages. 45 In 1968, an 
Australian journalist wrote of the sporadic brutality of the Army 
which carried out numerous beatings, shootings and goalings of 
Papuans in order to ensure a passive population in the lead-up to 
the Act of Free Choice. 46 
Reports of brutality, corruption and misuse of authority by 
mili tary personnel are too common to dismiss. 47 Australian 
military personnel involved in the mapping of Irian Jaya in 1977 
reported indiscriminate shooting of the local population. 48 In 
1984, shock waves from the murder by special forces soldiers of 
the renowned Irianese anthropologist, Arnold Ap, reverberated 
internationally.49 Amnesty International has voiced concern at 
reports of misconduct by military personnel in Irian Jaya noting 
that 'safeguards during interrogation and custody appear to be 
inadequate to prevent torture and ill-treatment from 
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occurring' .50 Examples of mili tary-run rackets such as the 
compulsory log-felling by Asmat tribesmen and the illegal 
harvesting of wildlife are well documented, 51 and military 
personnel have allegedly intimidated Irianese to provide land for 
transmigration sites. 52 
That it is necessary to remind troops that 'the military's 
presence should not cause misery to the people but rather raise 
their welfare' 53 is a sign of poor discipline and lack of 
accountabili ty in the armed forces. Such behaviour must have a 
negative effect on the Irianese people and provide a hollow ring 
to the motto of soldiers in Kodam VIII as 'protectors of the 
people' . 
Crossings of the border into Papua New Guinea reflect a regular 
cycle of rebellion, military response and flight to safety. The 
frequency and scale of the crossings indicate discontent, fear of 
the military, or fear of becoming involved in military or 
dissident operations. 54 At a rough estimate, around 20, 000 
. Irianese have crossed into Papua New Guinea since Indonesia 
gained control of the province: 1963-66: 573; 1967: 866; 1968: 
1,200; 1969: 1700; 1977-78: 3,000; 1983: 1,000; 1984: 11,000. 55 
Many of these border-crossers have returned to Irian Jaya but 
others are too frightened to return, preferring instead to 
forsake their land and remain in Papua New Guinea. 56 
Many of the crossings are associated wi th military operations 
held to ensure securi ty in the lead-up to national elections. 57 
Kodam VIII lists with pride operations to make the province 
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secure for general elections in 1971, 1977, 1982 and 1987, and 
for sittings of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1972, 
1978, 1983 and 1988 to elect the President and ratify state 
policy. 58 Calls by the commander of the armed forces to prevent 
disturbances to the 1992 elections throughout Indonesia began 
well in advance of the election. 59 Unless there has been a marked 
change in policy, a further flow of Irianese villagers into Papua 
New Guinea can be anticipated. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
In general terms, the 'backwardness' of the Irianese and the 
province is popularly accepted in Indonesia. 60 The Irianese are 
considered to be at a comparatively low level of cuI tural 
evolution. 61 Villagers are seen as crude and simple-minded, as 
being in need of leadership, education and instruction. 62 There 
is a 'disinclination to see Melanesian cuI ture as a cuI ture in 
its own right' and a inclination to 'Javanise' as rapidly as 
possible. 63 Not surprisingly, the Indonesian image of the 'dumb 
Papuan' (Papua boboh) has inevitably brought alienation, 
frustration and resentment. 64 
The feeling that Irianese culture is on a lower level and has to 
be made Indonesian before the people can progress is widespread 
in military circles. 65 The feeling is expressed in terms of 
terminating the backwardness of the Irianese people and in the 
duty of the military to bring development and enlightenment to 
them. 66 Matters such as poor personal hygiene, the importance of 
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pigs, non-sedentary agriculture, tribal fighting and heavy 
drinking are viewed as impediments to the introduction of an 
outlook amenable to military conceptions of change and 
development. 67 
Notwithstanding the national motto of 'Unity in Diversity', there 
is, in the opinion of military authorities, a requirement for a 
'cultural transformation' so that the Irianese can more readily 
accept development. 68 As noted earlier, development programs that 
improve welfare and raise the economic prosperity of the people 
are expected to have a beneficial effect on the securi ty 
situation in the province. 69 In the view of military authorities, 
'if the people (in Irian Jaya) are not prosperous, they will 
easily be swayed by (anti-government) propaganda' . 70 
The desire to change the culture of the Irianese is manifested in 
many ways. 71 For example, the first rice harvest in the Baliem 
Valley by Dani tribesmen in 1986 was regarded as a welcome sign 
of cultural assimilation and, accordingly, was greeted with due 
ceremony. At the time, the governor's message stated that it was 
important that the farmers 'should be made to love rice culture 
as they do the growing of their staple food plants, like the 
sweet potato'. 72 Similarly, the plan announced by President 
Suharto in 1969 to take 200,000 West Irianese children to other 
parts of Indonesia73 is indicative of the desire to eliminate 
cultural differences between the Irianese and other 
Indonesians. 74 The same conclusion can be reached regarding 
efforts to force the Asmat people to destroy their longhouses and 
live in standard houses in family units. 75 
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Operation Koteka (penis gourd), commenced in the early 1970s, was 
designed to bring the benefits of civilisation to the Dani people 
in the Baliem Valley. Managed by the Army, the name was based on 
the objective of persuading the highlanders to discard their 
penis gourds and to wear clothing. 76 Teams of around six, 
including soldiers, civil servants and students were despatched 
to villages for six months to teach the Dani personal hygiene, 
animal husbandry, life in a family unit and basic literacy.77 The 
objectives of the operation were coloured by reports of 
corruption and oppression and the forcible curtailment of 
traditional ceremonies leading to a Dani revolt in 1977. 78 
The transmigration program also aims to diminish cuI tural 
differences79 and facilitate national integration al though the 
goals of the program are far broader that this. Transmigration is 
intended to raise the living standards of the transmigrants, 
increase national agricul tural production, hasten the economic 
and social advancement of underdeveloped regions and relieve 
population pressure in Java and other areas. 80 The government 
says that the program is designed to help the Irianese learn new 
agricultural, marketing and other skills and benefit from 
infrastructure development. 81 Defence is also a function of the 
transmigration program with a view to establishing a buffer zone 
or security belt along the border with Papua New Guinea. 82 
The standard of living of the Irianese people is expected to 
improve through a process of social intercourse wi th the 
newcomers. 25 per cent of the places in the transmigration sites 
are reserved for local Irianese in the interests of acculturation 
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of the Irianese people. 83 The success of the program is judged in 
some respects by the readiness of the local population to welcome 
the transmigrants as part of their community. By this criterion, 
the program has not been successful. 84 One of the main problems 
in the program is the resentment and uncertainty caused by the 
al iena tion of tradi tional 1 and. The government considers 
infrastructure development associated with the construction and 
servicing of transmigration sites sufficient compensation for the 
tradi tional landowners. 85 It is clear that many Irianese do not 
share this view because, traditionally, land remains in clan 
ownership in perpetuity.86 
By 1990, around 150,000 officially-sponsored transmigrants had 
been settled in Irian Jaya together with a similar number of 
spontaneous or unassisted transmigrants. 87 The influx of the 
unassisted transmigrants - many from Sulawesi - has probably had 
a greater effect on the Irianese people, particularly in urban 
centres. The domination by unassisted transmigrants of unskilled 
wage labour, trade, transport, market gardening, fishing and 
logging has limited the employment opportunities of Irianese. 88 
As a result of efforts to force cultural change and the influx of 
newcomers, there is a feeling amongst many Irianese that they 
have been swamped by people who see no value in them or their 
cuI ture. 89 There is a resentment at the presence of foreigners 
and a desire to be left alone to preserve their culture or change 
it in their own way. 90 
Well over 50 per cent of the population lives in isolated, inland 
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settlements with limited education or health facilities and 
restricted opportunities for employment. Most of the major towns 
are located on the coast. Wi th few roads outside these towns, 
wider communication is dependent on sea and air transport. None 
of the nine regency capitals in Irian Jaya is connected by road 
with the capital of another regency and there are no roads 
linking the coast with the highlands. Air transport is expensive, 
limited and subject to the vagaries of the weather. 91 The supply 
of electricity, fresh water and the condition of infrastructure 
such as wharves is generally unsatisfactory.92 
In terms of per capita grants from the national government, 
however, Irian Jaya fares comparatively well compared with other 
Indonesian provinces and a high proportion of the province's 
development expenditure is directed to infrastructure 
development, communications and education.93 However, the extent 
to which the indigenous Irianese people are benefiting from 
development programs remains a vexed question. 94 The 
opportunities for growth and employment have been utilised 
largely by immigrants from other parts of Indonesia in urban 
centres. 95 
One cause of concern to the Irianese is the slow progress made in 
the provision of education and health services in isolated areas. 
In 1980, 80 per cent of school-age children reportedly attended 
primary school. 96 However, as a result of a shortage of teachers, 
the real figure - particularly in inland areas - may be closer to 
50 per cent. 97 Teachers are reluctant to work in remote highland 
regions because of the isolation, lack of amenities, lack of 
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knowledge of local customs and languages, and because their 
salaries are late and promotions delayed. 98 Even in the 
province's capi tal, Jayapura, primary school teachers complain 
that their pay and rice quota are continually late. 99 The head of 
Taja village in Jayapura regency said that the 80 pupils at the 
village school had no teacher and were dependent for their 
education on two soldiers on temporary assignment in the area. 100 
Many of the village heads in Paniai regency expressed 
dissatisfaction to the governor in 1990 because their village 
school had no teacher or because teachers who were assigned to 
their school did not return after taking holidays.10l 
The heal th system in isolated areas is equally unsatisfactory. 
Village heads have complained that their village has not 
benefited from development and that there has been little or no 
change from colonial times. 102 Many of the village health centres 
(puskesmas pembantu) have not functioned for years because of a 
shortage of medical assistants and medicines .103 A village head 
from Dobo in northern Biak claimed that 15 villagers died from 
malaria in July 1990 because there were no medical staff at the 
village health centre .104 
The feeling of neglect and the climate of contempt and unfair 
competition has made many Irianese feel like strangers in their 
own land. lOS This alienation is manifested in a pattern of flag-
raisings as a form of protest and in support for an independent 
West Papuan state. 106 
The Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM) numbers 
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around 500 dissidents in the field with a network of several 
thousand active sympathisers. 107 The statement by an Irianese that 
'we are all OPM' 108 indicates the extent of passive support and 
the difficulty of estimating the numerical strength of the 
movement, let alone its influence .109 Most OPM guerillas carry 
traditional weapons, including spears and bows and arrows. 110 
Notwi thstanding the movement's limi tations due to internal 
dissension, lack of equipment and foreign support, its very 
existence and persistence serves to question Indonesian policy 
and policy implementation in the province. 111 The reasons for its 
existence are similar to those of many other separatist movements 
- neglect, discrimination, oppression, and dissatisfaction wi th 
socio-economic changes .112 Other reasons incl ude the forced 
terri torial incorporation into Indonesia, loss of cuI tural 
identity, alienation of land and political repression. 113 
In public statements, the military describes the OPM as a 
criminal organisation involved in murder, kidnapping and 
terrorism. 114 Consistent with this view, the commander of the 
Indonesian armed forces reminded journalists following the 
extradi tion of OPM leader Melky Salossa from Papua New Guinea, 
'write that he is involved in crime, murder and creating security 
disturbances' .115 Indeed, separatist groups (in Irian Jaya, East 
Timor, Aceh or elsewhere) are described by the term GPK which 
means 'disturbers of the peace' or 'gangsters'. 116 To credi t the 
OPM with the title of freedom fighters or guerillas would be to 
acknowledge the existence of their cause and dissatisfaction with 
Indonesia's administration. Despi te the lapse of time, the 
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movement is still painted as a continuation of the Dutch colonial 
policy of divide et impera. 117 The Dutch are held responsible for 
planting 'time bombs' in the form of the OPM programmed to 
explode after their withdrawal 118 and for putting the idea of 
independence into the minds of a simple people. 119 
Publicly, the movement is treated with disdain by authorities as 
if it did not exist. 'Separatist movements, like (the) OPM or 
whatever is the name, do not exist wi thin (Irian Jaya)' 120 
Consequently, military operations against dissidents are mounted 
to prevent 'tribal clashes' and dissident activity is described 
as the exploitation of tribal clashes by third parties. 121 
In the mil i tary' s view, the low level of education in the 
province and lack of critical thought are held responsible for 
the ease with which people are swayed against authority. In this 
view, the OPM exists because of the limited time of Indonesian 
administration and - with the majority of the Irianese population 
living in isolated, inland settlements - the limited contact of 
many Irianese with development programs. Accordingly, the Kodam 
commander called on rebels on the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea 
border 'to join with the people, the government and the armed 
forces' to develop the province and make it prosperous .122 It is 
considered that development in the broadest sense - will 
eventually resolve the problem of the OPM: 123 
'We should not assume that the attractiveness of the OPM to 
the people can be easily overcome. All the more so if our 
treatment of the people does not improve. Now is the time 
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for us to give greater attention to the younger generation, 
particularly those in primary schools, through improved 
guidance, better education and increased welfare. It is this 
young generation that we hope will lead Irian Jaya to a 
brighter future. With such guidance, they will feel part of 
the Indonesian family ... Whatever happens, efforts for the 
complete development of Indonesian society in Irian Jaya 
must be hastened and increased ... The existence and concept 
of the OPM and all its manifestations will disappear with 
the success of development. 124 
SUMMARY 
The objectives of the military in Irian Jaya are to maintain 
securi ty and to motivate the population to participate in, and 
achieve, state-formulated development goals. These objectives 
correspond with the dual function of ABRI in Indonesian society 
as a military force (a stabiliser) and a social-political force 
(a dynamiser and motivator of the Indonesian people). 
As noted in chapter 1, security is viewed in holistic terms and 
efforts to improve securi ty are directed to raising the 
ideological, political, economic, cultural and defence awareness 
of the people. Territorial development aims to improve security 
by fostering in the people a desire to defend the nation and 
support its ideology, government and policies. These goals have 
not been achieved in Irian Jaya. 
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The perception that the Indonesian people are easily led astray 
and need to be controlled tightly may be exacerbated in Irian 
Jaya where the indigenous people are considered to be at a 
relatively low level of cultural evolution. This perception may 
explain why comparatively minor security incidents attract such a 
harsh response from the military. Whatever the reasons, there is 
an intolerance to opposition and an inclination to employ 
excessive force in the pursui t of securi ty obj ectives. Rather 
than improving security, the military's heavy-handed behaviour 
has encouraged dissatisfaction. 
For the military, development is a high-priority goal because of 
the interrelationship perceived between the people's welfare and 
the level of securi ty. Development programs take on an almost 
sacred mantle, whether or not they are of benefit to the 
indigenous population. In the estimation of the military, 
development is the key to good security and lack of development 
the cause of security problems. For the success of development 
programs (including programs to improve ideological and defence 
awareness as well as transmigration), a need is seen to 
'Indonesianise' the Irianese so that they are better disposed to 
accept development and progress. Practical benefits from existing 
development programs appear to have favoured immigrants from 
other parts of Indonesia in urban centres of Irian Jaya. 
The sense of neglect, fear and alienation felt by many Irianese 
is manifested in several ways including flag-raisings as a form 
of protest, crossings of the border into Papua New Guinea and 
support for an independent West Papuan state. 
<I 
' I 
~I 
I 
!l 
I~ I 
~J 
I 
70 
Notes to Chapter 3: 
1. A written request to the commander of Kodam VIII for military 
objectives in Irian Jaya was unanswered. 
2. Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, Fontana/Collins, 1980, 
p.34. 
3. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military 
Politics 1945-1967, Oxford University Press, Selangor, 1982, 
pp.140-3; McDonald, Ope cit., p.33. 
4. HQ TNI-AD, 'Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Daerah 
Militer (Kodam)', (Organisation and Tasks of a Kodam), Kasad 
Kep/4/1/1985, 12 January 1985. 
5. Seskoad, 'Sistem Pembinaan Terri torial " (The Terri torial 
Development System), brochure NSS 4112, Bandung, 1985, pp.1-8; 
Seskoad, 'Aspek Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembinaan 
Teri torial " (Planning and Control Aspects of Territorial 
Development), brochure NSS 4113, Bandung, 1985. 
6. McDonald, Ope cit., p.33. Sundhaussen, OPe cit., pp.58, 140. 
7. R. Soedarno Hadisoetopo, Komentar Pasal demi Pasal UU 
Hankamneg RI, (An Article by Article Commentary on the Defence 
and Security Law), Alumni, Bandung, 1985, p.125. 
8. Seskoad brochure 3342, 'Kodam Dalam Ops Binter', (The Kodam in 
Territorial Development Operations), Bandung, 1987. 
Responsibility for village-level security in Java has been 
devolved to the police. The effect of this on Wanra and Hansip is 
not known. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 March 1990, p.19. 
9. An assumption, based on the standard figures used in staff 
planning exercises at the Indonesian Army Command and Staff 
College, 1986-87. See also Seskoad, 'Cadangan Nasional', 
(National Reserves), brochure NSS-4114-A, Bandung, 1986. 
10. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, (Armed Forces Daily), 9 
April 1988, p.X. 
11. ibid., 22 October 1990, p.V11. 
12. Sundhaussen, 
Indonesian Armed 
p. 38; Al bert C. 
Indonesian Army 
1981, p.18. 
OPe cit., pp.168, 173; Khalid Abdullah, 'The 
Forces: ABRI', Asian Defence Journal, 5, 1982, 
Waldack and John B. Haseman, 'Dwi-Fungsi: The 
in Civil Affairs', Military Review, September 
13. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 13 July 1990, p.V11. 
14. Construction projects may include houses, village halls, 
places of worship, soccer fields, volley-ball courts and the 
provision of water. National awareness programs may involve flag-
raising ceremonies in schools, the singing of national songs and 
lectures on Indonesia's struggle for independence. Welfare 
obj ectives are pursued by providing information on gardening, 
-'11 
'I; 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
If 
'I, 
I 
II 
1" 
, 
~ 
I 
~1!. 
71 
animal husbandry, heal th and family planning while defence and 
security objectives can involve 'neighbourhood watch' exercises 
(latihan ronda kampung) or lectures concerning juvenile 
delinquincy. See Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 2 July 1990, 
p.V11; 5 September 1990, p.V11; 12 November 1990, p.V11. 
15. ibid., 2 July 1990, p.Vl1; 12 November 1990, p.V11. 
16. Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, Irian Jaya: The 
Transformation of a Melanesian Economy, ANU Press, Canberra, 
1974, pp.24-5. 
17. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 10 January 1989, p.X. 
18. ibid., 24 November 1988, p.X. 
19. ibid., 24 November 1988, p.X; 10 January 1989, p.X; 2 
February 1989, p.X; 13 February 1989, p.X; 24 April 1989, p.X. 
20. ibid., 2 February 1989, p.X; 13 February 1989, p.X. 
21. ibid., 19 September 1990, p.V11; 20 July 1991, pp.1, Xl. 
22. ibid., 10 January 1989, p.X; 6 February 1989, p.X. 
23. Garnaut and Manning, Ope cit., pp.22-3; Robin Osborne, 
Indonesia's Secret War, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, P .135; 
David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military 
Politics 1975-1983, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 
1984, p.45; David Jenkins, 'Restive province is far from an armed 
camp', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 1985, p.8; Seskoad, 
'Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 1986 
tentang Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah', (President of Indonesia's 
Decision 10/1986 on the Area Leader's Conference), brochure NSS-
4222, Bandung, 27 February 1986. 
24. McDonald, Ope cit., p.94. 
25. Eddy Supardi (ed.), Kabinet Pembangunan V Beserta Buku Alamat 
Pejabat Negeri RI, (The Fifth Development Cabinet and Address 
Book of Government Officials), AIda, Jakarta, 1989, p.X. 
26. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 9 July 1987, p.X; 21 March 
1989, p.X. 
27. A chronological summary of ground and air operations is given 
in Malcolm Gaul t-Williams, 'Organisasi Papua Merdeka: The Free 
Papua Movement Lives', Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 19, 
4, 1987, p.38. 
28. William Henderson, West New Guinea: The Dispute and its 
Settlement, Seton Hall University Press, 1973, p.217. 
29. Peter Hastings, 'National Integration in Indonesia: The Case 
of Irian Jaya', Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), Armed Separatism 
in Southeast Asia, Insti tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1984, p.140. 
" 
I 
II 
I 
'I! 
I 
)! 
III 
i) 
_d 
72 
30. Osborne, op. cit., pp.58, 61, 70, 93, 98. 
31. ibid., p.38. 
32. An Indonesian account of these operations is given in A. 
Ismail et al., Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa, (A Chronogical 
Account of Irian Jaya), Sejarah Militer Kodam XV11/Cenderawasih, 
1971. 
33. Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia Since Sukarno, Asia 
Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971, pp.132-3; Henderson, OPe cit., 
p. 223; Kees Lagerberg, west Irian and Jakarta Imperialism, C. 
Hurst and Company, London, 1979, p.111; Brian May, The Indonesian 
Tragedy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, p.167, notes 
that by August 1968, 168 tribesmen had been killed and more than 
3,500 had surrendered. Nonie Sharp, The Rule of the Sword: The 
Story of west Irian, Kibble Books, Malmsbury, 1977, p.20, 
states that 1,000 were killed by the Air Force in Manokwari. 
34. van der Kroef, op. cit., p.145. 
35. van der Kroef, Ope cit., pp.145-6; Henderson, OPe c i t., 
p.224; Brian May, OPe cit., p.173; Sharp, op. cit., p.21. 
36. Brian May, OPe cit., p.175. 
37. van der Kroef, Ope cit., p.154. 
38. Tapol, west Papua: The Obliteration of a People, London, 
1983, pp.95-7. 
39. Osborne, Ope cit., pp.66-8. 
40. Sharp, op. cit., pp.6, 24. 
41. Tapol, op. cit., pp.74-6. 
42. Osborne, Ope cit., p.99. 
43. George Monbiot, Poisoned Arrows, Michael Joseph, London, 
1989, p.217. 
44. van der Kroef, OPe cit., p.130. 
45. ibid., p.132. 
46. ibid., p.128. See also p.151. 
47. Tapol, OPe cit., pp.72-4; Monbiot, Ope cit., p.144. 
48. Peter Savage, 'Irian Jaya: Reluctant Colony', R. Crocombe and 
A. Ali (eds), Politics in Melanesia, Insti tute of Pacific 
Studies, USP, Suva, 1982, p.26; Osborne, Ope cit., pp.65-7. 
49. 'Behind the killing of Arnold Ap', 
July 1984, p.21. See also Osborne, 
Monbiot, Ope cit., p.179; 
Pacific Islands Monthly, 
o p. cit., pp . 148 -154 ; 
! 
: 1 
!, 
41" 
, 
I' I 
'I 
I ' 
I ~ 
I 
I: 
I , 
~tll 
73 
50. 'statement of Amnesty International's Concerns in Indonesia', 
No. ASA 21/33/85, International Secretariat, London, p.9. 
51. Tapol, op. cit., pp.47-8; Osborne, op. cit., pp.123-4; 
Monbiot, op. cit., pp.53, 160; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, op. 
cit., p.143. 
52. Osborne, op. cit., pp.130-1. 
53. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 22 October 1990, p.V11. 
54. R.J. May (ed.), 
Associates, Bathurst, 
Between Two Nations, 
1986, pp.207-8. 
Robert Brown and 
55. van der Kroef, op. cit., p.144; Sharp, op. cit., p.4; 
Osborne, op. cit., p.176; R.J. May, op. cit., pp.41, 57, 60, 89, 
120; Savage, op. cit., pp.17, 26. These sources vary in several 
details and some of the border-crossers may have sought refuge in 
Papua New Guinea on more than one occasion. R.J. May, op. cit., 
p .135, estimates that there are around 2,000-3,000 Irian-born 
permanent residents in Papua New Guinea. 
56. Sharp, op. cit., p.8. 
57. Osborne, op. cit., p.136. 
58. '38 tahun 
V111/Trikora), 
p.V11. 
Kodam V111/Trikora', (38 years of Kodam 
Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 1 August 1990, 
59. ibid., 19 September 1990, p.1. 
60. van der Kroef, op. cit., p.153; Tapol, op. cit., pp.69-70. 
61. Brian May, op. cit., p.180; Osborne, op. cit., p.19; E.P. 
Wolfers (ed.), Beyond the Border, UPNG and USP, Waigani and Suva, 
1988, p.113. 
62. Sharp, op. cit., p.36; Osborne, op. cit., p.xvi; Tapol, op. 
cit., p.58; Monbiot, op. cit., pp.54, 152. 
63. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, op. cit., pp.129-30; Osborne, op. 
cit., pp.34, 137, 140. 
64. van der Kroef, op. cit., pp.126-7; Lagerberg, op. cit., p.7. 
65. Osborne, op. cit., p.77. 
66. Ismail, op. cit., pp.xvii-xviii, 220. 
67. Lieutenant-General Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Berbagai Permasalahan 
di Irian Jaya', (Problems in Irian Jaya), Ilmu pengetahuan dan 
Teknologi, 2, Jakarta, 1985, passim; Lieutenant-General Kahpi 
Suriadirej a, 'Pengembangan Irian Jaya di tinj au dari segi 
ketahanan nasional', (Development in Irian Jaya from the 
viewpoint of national resilience), Manuel Kasiepo et al. (eds), 
Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedalaman Irian Jaya, Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, Jakarta, 1987, passim. 
I,·' 
74 
68. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 22 October 1990, p.V11. 
69. Suriadireja, 'Development in Irian Jaya from the viewpoint of 
national resilience', Ope cit., pp.56, 67. 
70. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 22 October 1990, p.V11. 
71. Parallels with Australia's treatment of aborigines are clear. 
Donald Thomson, writing in 1936, said: 'Most of the projects that 
have so far been advanced for dealing with Aborigines assume at 
once that their culture is to be destroyed; they aim vaguely at 
'betterment' of the people ... Another almost invariable assumption 
is that the first essential in dealing with Australian Aborigines 
is to curtail their wanderings, to settle them either in a 
compound or an institution, or to remove their children from 
their custody to these places in order that they shall grow up 
without any knowledge of the life and customs of their own 
people'. Donald Thomson, Donald Thomson in Arnhem Land, Currey 
O'Neil Ross, Melbourne, 1983, p.79. 
72. 'Dani tribesmen have first rice harvest in Baliem Valley', 
Jakarta Post, 17 September 1986, p.3. 
73. van der Kroef, Ope cit., p.154; Monbiot, Ope cit., p.178. 
74. Monbiot, OPe cit., p.229. 
75. ibid., pp.149, 159. 
76. Garnaut and Manning, Ope cit., p.24. 
77. ibid., pp.90-1; Sharp, Ope cit., p.25. 
78. Osborne, Ope cit., pp.67-8; Tapol, OPe cit., pp.63-6; 
Monbiot, OPe cit., pp.178-9. 
79. Monbiot, Ope cit., p.229. 
80. For a discussion of transmigration, see Chris Manning and 
Michael Rumbiak, Economic Development, Migrant Labour and 
Indigenous Welfare in Irian Jaya 1970-1984, Monograph, Australian 
National University, 1987; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, Ope cit; H. 
Arndt in R.J. May, OPe cit; Osborne, OPe cit., p.126. 
81. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, Ope cit., p.141; Tapol, Ope 
p.60; Monbiot, Ope cit., p.40; 'Policies for Irian 
blameless: Dr Mochtar', Canberra Times, 17 November 1985. 
cit. , 
Jaya 
82. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, Ope cit., p.141; Tapol, Ope cit., 
pp.52-3; Monbiot, Ope cit., p.231; Suriadireja, 'Problems in 
Irian Jaya', Ope cit., p.11. 
83. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, OPe cit., p.142; Osborne, OPe cit., 
p.132. 
84. Loekman Soetrisno, 'Peranan Transmigrasi dalam Stabilitas 
Sosial Politik Daerah Perbatasan and Problematiknya: Kasus Irian 
Jaya', (The Role of Transmigration in the Social-Political 
.... 
I 
/1 
' I 
\ 
I 
II ], 
" 
III: 
I 
III 
~\ 
.lJ 
75 
stability of Border Areas: The Case of Irian Jaya), Sri-Edi 
Swasono and Masri Singarinbun (eds), Sepuluh Windhu Transmigrasi 
di Indonesia 1905-1985, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1985, 
pp.115-127. 
85. Osborne, OPe cit., p.130; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, Ope cit., 
p.142. 
86. Osborne, OPe cit., pp.2-3; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, OPe 
cit., pp.131, 142; Monbiot, Ope cit., p.52. 
87. See Manning and Rumbiak, Ope cit., pp.26, 56 and Tom Hyland, 
'From crowded Java to the promised land', Canberra Times, 24 
September 1989, p.24. The precise number of government-sponsored 
and unassisted or spontaneous transmigrants in Irian Jaya is 
difficult to specify. Tapol Bulletin, 86, 1988, p.17, states 
nearly 140,000 transmigrants had been brought to the province by 
the end of the 1970s; Arndt (quoting Hastings) in R.J. May, Ope 
ci t., p. 170, states that 160,000 spontaneous transmigrants had 
arrived in Irian Jaya by 1983; Osborne, OPe cit., p.130, states 
70,000 sponsored and 160,000 spontaneous transmigrants had 
arrived by 1984; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, Ope cit., p.141, 
mentions 60,000 sponsored and 160,000 spontaneous transmigrants; 
Monbiot, Ope cit., p.181, gives figures of 100,000 government-
sponsored and 180,000 unassisted transmigrants in 1988. 
88. Arndt in R.J. May, Ope cit., p.170; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, 
Ope cit., p.141; Tapol, OPe cit., p.56; Garnaut and Manning, OPe 
cit., p. 37; See also David Jenkins, 'The us and them world of 
Irian Jaya', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1985, p.31. 
89. Monbiot, OPe cit., p.181. 
90. Brian May, OPe cit., p.180; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, Ope 
cit., p.143. 
91. Department of Home Affairs, Development in Irian Jaya, 
Jakarta, July 1985, p.2. 
92. E. Soewandha Natanegara, Api Perjuangan Pembebasan Irian 
Barat, (The Struggle for the Freedom of West Irian), Yayasan 
Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, Jakarta, 1986, 
pp.402, 437, 460. 
93. Manning and Rumbiak, Ope cit., pp.8-11, 75; Hastings in Lim 
Joo-Jock, OPe cit., pp.139-40; 'More new roads to be built in 
Irian Jaya', Jakarta Post, 27 December 1986. 
94. Chris Manning, 'Irian Jaya's migrants gain economic clout', 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 April 1987, pp.41, 43; Sharp, OPe 
cit., p.27-8. 
95. Garnaut and Manning, Ope cit., p.81. 
96. Chris Manning, 'Irian Jaya' s migrants gain economic clout', 
OPe cit., p.40. 
97. Daniel Aj amiseba, 'Primary Education in Irian Jaya', Irian: 
I 
III 
I 
I 
I 
76 
Bulletin of Irian Jaya, XV, 1987, p.6, states 'only 50 per cent 
of school-age children attend primary schools in this province'. 
Hastings noted that '60 per cent of Irianese school-age children 
are still not reached by the government education or health care 
systems'. See Lim Joo-Jock, op. cit., p.142. 
98. Ajamiseba, op. cit., pp.6-7. 
99. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 13 July 1990, p.1X. 
100. ibid., 5 July 1989, p.X. 
101. ibid., 6 September 1990, p.1X. 
102. 'Memprihatinkan, kesehatan masyarakat Irja', (Health of 
Irianese people causes concern), ibid., 6 September 1990, p.1X. 
103. 'Banyak Puskesmas pembantu di Irj a tidak berfungsi' (Many 
village health centres in Irian Jaya do not function), ibid., 18 
September 1990, p.X. 
104. ibid., 18 September 1990, p.X. 
105. Lagerberg, op. cit., p.113; Sharp, op. cit., p.2. 
106. Osborne, op. cit., p.11; Tapol, op. cit., pp.81-3. 
107. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, op. cit., p.137, estimates '700 to 
1,000 members, which include dependents and sympathisers'; Ralph 
Premdas in Kabar Seberang, 15, 1985, p.66, states 'most reliable 
sources accept an estimate of 400-600 hard core guerillas with an 
extensive network of floating recruits'. A Department of Defence 
submission in 1989 to the Joint Commi ttee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade stated 'The OPM has no more than several 
hundred hard-core activists fighting in the jungle. In strictly 
military terms, the OPM is weak, poorly armed and trained. It has 
only limited firearms and is reliant on tradi tional weapons'. 
(See 'Australia's Relations with Papua New Guinea', official 
Hansard report, vol 1, p.S104.) Jacob Prai, an OPM leader, stated 
in 1981 that the movement had 'seven regional commands ... (each 
wi th) anything between a thousand and several thousand trained 
troops'; in 1982, OPM leader Seth Rumkorem said that '30,000 
Papuans were active throughout the country' (Tapol, op. cit. , 
pp.98, 100; R.J. May, op. cit., p.61). More recently, James Nyaro 
claimed he commanded up to 35,000 guerrillas (Osborne, op. cit., 
p. 96). Brian May, op. cit., p.184, noted the difficulty of 
establishing facts from Irianese accounts of events. Hastings in 
R.J. May, op. cit., p.224, makes a similar observation. 
108. Brian May, op. cit., p.182. 
109. Brian May, op. cit., p.181, and Monbiot, op. cit., pp.203-
4, note that many Irianese fear the OPM. 
110. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, op. cit., p.137. 
Ill. Sharp, op. cit., p.18. 
,., 
i 
III 
77 
112. The Free Aceh Movement has a strong Islamic basis but the 
underlying reasons that gave rise to its birth and sustained its 
existence are similar to those in Irian Jaya: a perception that 
the development of Aceh had been neglected; employment practices 
that discriminated against Acehnese; and the inflow of foreign 
socio-political values based on the government's 'assimilation' 
strategy. See Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, 'Issues and politics of 
regionalism in Indonesia: Evaluating the Acehnese experience', 
Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), op. cit., pp.124-6. 
113. Ralph Premdas, 'The Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Irian Jaya', 
Asian Survey, XXV, 10, October 1985, p.1062; Suriadireja, 
'Problems in Irian Jaya', pp.8-9; Monbiot, op. cit., p.183. 
114. van der Kroef, op. cit., p.152. In the same vein, the Free 
Aceh Movement is depicted as a criminal and not a political 
organisation. According to military spokesmen, the Free Aceh 
Movement is made up of criminals , military deserters, and 
marijuana growers resentful over a military drug eradication 
program. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 October 1990, p.22 
and 24 January 1991, p.21; Sydney Morning Herald, 28 December 
1990, p.9; and Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 12 July 1990, 
pp.1, X. 
115. General Sutrisno as reported in Indonesian Observer, 4 
October 1990, p.1. 
116. Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK). See Indonesian Observer, 
3 August 1990, p.1. This terminology has replaced the initials 
GPL which stood for 'wild terrorist gangs' (See Tapol, op. cit., 
p.25). 
117. Department of Information, OPM: Aftermath of Colonialism, 
Jakarta, September 1976, p.15. 
118. ibid., p.7; Lagerberg, op. cit., p.13; Osborne, op. cit., 
p.32. 
119. Brian May, op. cit., p.196. 
120. Department of Information, OPM, Aftermath of Colonialism, 
p.15. Similarly, the size of, and popular support for, the Free 
Aceh Movement is probably understated. The governor of Aceh said 
in 1990 that 'there are only around 36 of the criminals left ... ' 
See Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 12 July 1990, p.1. 
121. Sharp, op. cit., p.6; Osborne, op. cit., p.160; Lagerberg, 
op. cit., pp.7, 113. 
122. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 1 December 1990, p.V11. 
Similarly, the governor of Aceh (commenting on the security 
situation in the wake of the Free Aceh Movement rebellion) said: 
'History proves that development is impossible to effect without 
a stable security situation. With instability, prosperity shrinks 
to the rear, while misery and suffering move to the fore.' 
Governor Ibrahim Hasan, ibid., 12 July 1990, p.1X. 
123. Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata, 23 October 1990, p.V11; 
III 
78 
Tapol Bulletin No. 102, December 1990, p.6. 
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4. CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
As noted in chapter 1, Indonesia will not allow Irian Jaya to 
become independent. To do so would be to invite the 
disintegration of the Republic. 1 Realistically, the best that can 
be hoped for is a realisation on the part of the national and 
provincial authorities that the scope and pace of development 
programs in Irian Jaya should take greater account of the wishes 
of the Irianese people. Further, security incidents should be 
seen by the military as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with 
government policy and the implementation of policy. If more 
attention was given to resolving the underlying causes of 
dissatisfaction rather than to heavy-handed retribution, the 
likelihood of prolonged dissatisfaction in the province would be 
lessened considerably. 
Warnings on the negative aspects of development programs are 
clear enough. In 1983, for example, the then Kodam commander 
advised the government to reduce transmigration because it had 
made the Irianese 'feel like strangers in their own land,. 2 
Transmigration has since slowed considerably, but this is 
probably due more to the low soil fertility, lack of sui table 
sites, and the high cost of the program3 than to a desire to take 
account of the sensitivities of the Irianese people. Another 
former commander warned against encouraging Irianese to eat rice 
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and the danger of immigrants from Makasar (Sulawesi) establishing 
economic and trade monopolies. 4 He noted that the lack of 
employment and educational opportunities for the indigenous 
Irianese, together with their treatment as second-class citizens, 
were contributing factors to publ ic support for the OPM. 5 
Provincial development reports make the point that the Irianese 
people should be given more say in the formulation and 
implementation of development programs. 6 Until the aspirations of 
the Irianese are given full attention, many of the indigenous 
inhabi tants of Irian Jaya will remain reluctant to accept the 
authority of the Indonesian government. 
The powerful influence of the media, the widespread use of the 
Indonesian language 7 and the strong ideological focus in 
education are all reasons for the gradual but coerced integration 
of the province into the larger Indonesian society. On the other 
hand, the arrival of large numbers of migrants from outside the 
province, the alienation of tradi tional land, the harshness of 
the mili tary, the treatment of the Irianese as cuI turally 
backward and efforts to effect a cultural transformation provide 
reasons for the continuance of dissatisfaction. 
The military's support for development programs is a further 
reason for continued dissatisfaction. For the military, 
development has both a physical and a mental dimension. It 
encompasses not only economic measures to improve the welfare of 
the people, but also cuI tural assimilation, transmigration and 
programs to develop an awareness of Indonesia's national 
philosophy and system of total people's defence. Some of these 
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programs are the root cause of the dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, 
they are likely to be supported vigorously by the military 
because development is perceived to be the remedy for security 
problems and lack of development the cause of the problems. 8 In 
the absence of a dramatic change to the military's role in social 
and political affairs, it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the dissatisfaction of many Irianese with the Indonesian 
system will continue for some time yet. 
On a broader level, the dissatisfaction of many Irianese wi th 
government policies will continue to have an irritating effect on 
regional security and international relations. Dissident activity 
in Irian Jaya periodically spills over the border through the use 
by OPM separatists of Papua New Guinea as a safe haven, the 
pursuit of rebels across the border by Indonesian troops, and the 
crossing of Irianese into Papua New Guinea to seek refuge. From 
the Indonesian perspective, the Papua New Guinea government was 
considered to have tacitly sympathised with the OPM cause9 and to 
be half-hearted in fulfilling its agreement not to allow its 
territory to be used for hostile acts against Indonesia. 10 Despite 
successful efforts by both governments to increase communication, 
cooperation and mutual understanding over the past years,ll 
continued dissatisfaction in Irian Jaya is likely to give rise to 
occasional tension between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea which, 
inevitably, will have a negative effect on the Australia-
Indonesia relationship. 
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